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Greenberg v.Miami Children'sHospital: Unjust
Enrichment and the Patenting of Human Genetic
Material
Debra L. Greenfield,J.D.

I. INTRODUCTION

The complete sequencing of the human genetic code offers numerous
opportunities for scientific progress and advancements in medicine.
However. genetics has become not only a vast scientific enterprise, but a
commercial one as well. supported by the ability of both purely scientific
researchers, as well as biotechnological firms to procure patents on these
gene sequences. These patents often result in restrictions upon the use of
genome sequences. The practice of patenting human genetic material
within the context of medical research and human health care is being
fiercely critiqued and raises diverse ethical, social, and political objections.'
Additionally, critics are finding evidence suggesting that the status and
practice of patenting human genetic material is creating numerous
limitations on scientific progress in the areas of biomedical research and
human health care and should be subject to reform. 2 In light of these
concerns, controversies will materialize from the ensuing "gold rush"3 on
Ms. Greenfield is an attome\ practicing in the area of bioethics and is a fellow w ith the
Institute on Biotechnology and the Human Future.
1. See, e.g.. Melissa L. Sturges. Note & Comment, Who Should Hold Property Rights to
the Human Genome ' An Application of the Common Heritage of Humankind, 13 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 219 (1997). See also Jonathan Kahn, What's the Use:' Law and Authority in
Patenting Human Genetic Material. 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 417 (2003).
2. See. e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, SCIENCE, May 1, 1998, at 698; Lori B. Andrews,
The Gene Patent Dilemma. Balancing Commercial Incentives with Health Needs, 2 Hous. J.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 65, 66-67 (2002); Laurie L. Hill, The Race to Patent the Genome: Free
Riders, Hold Ups and the Future of Medical Breakthroughs, 11 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J.
221, 245-46 (2003); Sheldon Krimsky, The Profit of Scientific Discover, and Its Normative
Implications, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 15 (1999).
3. See LORI ANDREWS & DOROTHY NELK1N, BODY BAZAAR: THE MARKET FOR HUMAN
TISSUE INTHE BIOTECHNOLOGY AGE 42 (2001) (characterizing the commercialization of the
human genome as such).
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the use of human genetic material, as both individuals as well as societal
groups challenge the practice and its effects.
One recently decided case arguably provides a broad and farreaching legal theory and basis upon which the critics of human gene
patents can rely. The common law cause of action for unjust enrichment
provides a precedent for challenging the commercialization and patenting of
human genetic material given to researchers for the purpose of discerning
medical and scientific knowledge meant to benefit society at large.
Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital Research Institute, Inc.4 involved
subjects who instigated research to isolate the gene for Canavan disease and
who for numerous years supplied vital and critical materials and resources
for the investigation. The subjects were unaware of the doctors' and
hospitals' intentions to commercialize the fruits of the work. Six claims
were alleged, including breaches of informed consent and fiduciary duties,
fraudulent concealment, conversion, and misappropriation of trade secrets.
Count III of the complaint alleged that the defendants had been "unjustly
enriched" by their actions in patenting, licensing, and restricting the use of
the gene. This was the only claim to survive the defendants' motions to
6
dismiss.
The surviving cause of action for unjust enrichment suggests broad
implications beyond the narrow\' reading of the facts of the case. By
examining the cause of action, including its conceptual underpinnings and
its application in Greenberg, it can be seen as a possible tool for plaintiffs
contesting the patenting of human genetic material or questioning its
effects. Where the finding of an inequity is the basis for the legal argument,
it is also possible to identify inequities that support the ethical, social,
scientific, and political critiques against human gene patenting.
By
7
adhering to its traditional roots as a "flexible, broad-based theory" and by
finding numerous analogies within the current law, unjust enrichment
provides one legal alternative as a rationale for necessitating changes in
policy dealing with the patenting of human genetic material.
II.

UNJUST ENRICHMENT: THE CAUSE OF ACTION

The legal concept of restitution has both remedial and substantive
aspects.
It exists within the traditional contract and tort framework,
4. Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst.. Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064,
1066 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
5.
Id. at 1068.
6. Id. at 1073.
7. See Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, Forum Restitution In Public Concern Cases,
36 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 901 (2003) (discussing the use of unjust enrichment in cases of public
concern such as lead, tobacco, asbestos, etc.).
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wherein a breach may give rise to a remedy based upon restitution when, as
a consequence of that breach, the defendant has been unjustly enriched.
Substantive restitution, commonly known as "unjust enrichment" is a
separate cause of action and exists wholly independent of tort or contract.
Varying terms are also used to describe the cause of action, such as "quasicontract," or the older "monies had and received" or "restitution to prevent
unjust enrichment" in the reported cases." 8 Although imprecision has
resulted from overlapping definitions and descriptions, the basic underlying
principles retain broad acceptance.
The fundamental precepts include: "[a] person who has been unjustly
enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the
other," 9 and "[a] person is enriched if he has received a benefit, and a
person is unjustly enriched if the retention of the benefit would be unjust."' 1
These principles lack precise definitions and scholars continue to debate
their exact meaning.
The most widely cited and discussed view associates unjust enrichment
with a notion of equity in the broadest sense." In eighteenth century
England, Lord Mansfield explained that "the gist of this kind of action is,
that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties
of natural justice and equity to refund the money."' 2 The quote identifies "a
substantial tradition in English and American law of referring to unjust
enrichment as if it were something identifiable a priori, by the exercise of a
moral judgment anterior to legal rules."' 3 Justice Cardozo echoed this
traditional view in American law, writing that the test was whether a benefit
"was received in such circumstances that the possessor will give offense to
equity and good conscience if permitted to retain it.,' 14 A recent description

8.

See Equilease Corp. v. Lando, 634 F.2d 850, 853 (5th Cir. 1981).

9. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION: UNJUST ENRICHMENT §1 (1937) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT FIRST]; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST

ENRICHMENT §l (Discussion Draft 2000) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT THIRD].
10.
11.

RESTATEMENT FIRST, supra note 9, §1 cmt. a.
See, e.g., Equilease Corp., 634 F.2d at 852 (stating "[b]y whatever its name the

theory of recovery is a creature of equity and governed by principles of equity."); Tooltrend
Inc. v. CMT Utensili, SRL, 198 F.3d 802, 805 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting "[a] claim of unjust
enrichment is an equitable claim based on a legal fiction created by courts to imply a
'contract' as a matter of law."). See also Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 7, at 901 ("The
plaintiffs use, either explicitly or implicitly, the broad concept of restitution found in section
one of the Restatement of the Law of Restitution.").
12. See Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust
Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2083, 2087 (2001) (quoting Moses v. Macferlan, 97 Eng. Rep.

676, 681 (K.B. 1760)).
13. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 9, § I cmt. b.
14. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 525 (2d ed. 1994) (citing
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301, 309 (1935)).
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of this interpretation of the claim calls it "a direct appeal to a standard of
equitable and conscientious behavior as a source of obligations that society
will enforce with a legal sanction."' 5
This broad reading has historically given a "gap-filling"' 6 character to
the cause of action, where neither tort, contract, nor property theories were
appropriate. The theory was thus applied in situations that could not be
enumerated exhaustively. Claims of unjust enrichment easily exist when a
defendant unlawfully acquires a benefit from the plaintiff. Furthermore, a
defendant may be unjustly enriched without having committed any other
civil wrong. This can occur when one is enriched by accepting mistaken
payments or improvements or through another's discharge of a joint
obligation. 17 A defendant who benefits from the unauthorized use of his
neighbor's goods may be liable for unjust enrichment regardless of whether
he would be liable for conversion." Scenarios giving rise to defenses
against contract enforcement, such as undue influence, duress or the abuse
of position may be the basis of the claim,' 9 or when passive acceptance of a
benefit would be deemed unconscionable. 0 Despite current suggestions to
narrow the principle as an aid to predictability, 2 cases of unjust enrichment
often resist classification. Instead, they can be understood simply as
instances of equitable decision-making, where the defendant gains at the
22
plaintiff s expense.
I5 RESTATE\iF \T THIRD, supra note 9, 1 cmt. b.
16. David N Fagan, Note. .4chieving Restitution: The Potential Unjust Enrichment
Claims of Indigenous Peoples .4gainst Multinational Corporations,76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 626,
629 (2001) (noting "[u]njust enrichment originated as a theory of recovery in order to fill
gaps left uncovered by traditional legal categories, such as contract, tort and property law").
17

J,%\%its

1X

REST.\TE\INT (SI.C

FISCHER, LNiDERSTANDING REMEDIES 34

\D) OF RESTITUTION

41999).

, 45(2) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1984).

19. RESTATE\IENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION §1 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983).
20. FiscHi R. supra note 17, at 304 (citing Zoppo v. City of Manchester, 453 A.2d 1311,
1313 (N.H. 1982)).
21. Set RESTATE.IINT THIRD, supra note 9, § I cmt. b (distinguishing "unjust
enrichment" from the narrower doctrine of "unjustified enrichment," in which the
enrichment lacks an adequate legal basis and generally results from a transfer that the law
deems ineffective in altering ownership rights. Since legally effective transfers result based
on a consensual exchange, a valid gift, or a legal duty, "the concern with restitution is
predictably with those anomalous transfers that cannot be justified by the terms of a valid
and enforceable exchange transaction, by the intention of the transferor to make a gift; or by
the existence of a legal duty to the transferee.").
22
See Sherwin, supra note 12, at 2089-90 (discussing Sharp v. Kosmalski, 351 N.E.2d
721 (N.Y. 1976) and Kossian v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 254 Cal. App. 2d 647 (1967). Sharp
found "equity should intervene" when the promise to give a companion/caregiver a farm as a
substitute for marriage was revoked. Sharp, 351 N.E.2d at 123. In Kossian, a bankrupt
motel owner failed to pay a cleaner for her services and the subsequent owner then took
possession of the clean premises and collected on insurance for the cost of cleaning the
property. Kossian, 254 Cal. App. 2d at 648. Thus, the court found the double
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The decisional framework thus denotes flexibility and the cause of action
has been used to provide "new solutions to old problems. 23 It has
additionally been seen as having the potential to address novel societal
problems in changing times.-24 In cases of first impression, such as
Greenberg. or in future cases such as those dealing with the patenting of
human genetic material for commercial gain, it is arguable that the scope of
the claim will enable findings of unjust enrichment. This is especially true
where courts adhere to the traditional roots grounded in broad concepts of
equity.
III.

UNJUST E\RICHMENT: THE PRIMA FACIE CASE

Although the test might have variations depending on a particular
jurisdiction, the following elements need to be proven in a prima facie case.
These elements are: a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff;
awareness, appreciation, or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and
acceptance or retention of the benefit by the defendant under such
circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the
benefit without payment to the plaintiff. 25
A. The Vature of a Benefit:
The concept of benefit is broad and encompassing. A person confers a
benefit if he gives possession of or an interest in money, land, or chattels.
Conferral also occurs if he performs services beneficial to or at the request
of the other, satisfies a debt or a duty to the other, or in any way adds to the
other's security or advantage. It has been generally stated and consistently
understood that the word benefit denotes "any form of advantage. '
Furthermore, an individual "confers a benefit not only where he adds to
the property of another, but also where he saves the other from expense or
loss. '' 27 In the context of patents on human genetic material, a benefit is
realized when the acquisition of genetic material constitutes a "saving" to

indemnification against "equitable principles of unjust enrichment." Id. at 651.).
23. See Fagan, supra note 16, at 629 (citing JACK BEATSON, THE USE AND ABUSE OF
UNJUST ENRICHMENT: ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 209 (1991)).

24. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 7, at 901 (discussing the potential use of the claim
for addressing harms done to large populations including: corporate corruption, tobacco,
asbestos, lead, and water pollution).
25. See Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d
1064, 1072 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (citing Tooltrend, Inc. v. CMT Utensili SRL, 198 F.3d 802, 805
(11 th Cir. 1999) and Duncan v. Kasim, Inc., 810 So. 2d 968, 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
26.

LAYCOCK, supra note 14, at 527.

27.

FISCHER, supra note 17, at 303 (quoting Chem. Bank v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply

Sys., 691 P.2d 524, 544 (Wash. 1984)).
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potential defendants involved in profiting from the use of such material. In
28
the Greenberg case, the molecular biologist identifying the Canavan gene
discussed how the use of particular genetic material provided such savings
to the research institution attempting to isolate the gene:
Obtaining the Dor Yeshorim samples saved us and MCH (Miami
Children's Hospital) a tremendous amount of time in our research. It
would have taken us and MCH years to collect that many samples from
Ashkenazi Jewish individuals. Instead the whole process was completed
in six months ....

Obtaining the ... samples saved us and MCH millions

of dollars in expenses to identify... and obtain samples. In addition...
I would estimate that the value of each of these blood samples ....
would have themselves been at least S 150.00 to $250.00.
The blood, tissue and other samples that were provided to us by families
with the Canavan gene mutation ... were worth far more than $200.00 a
sample. In fact, the values of the samples is difficult, if not impossible to
measure because they were indispensable
to our research and i.ot readily
29
available to us from any other source.
Genetic material obtained by research institutions or biotechnology
corporations can thus be considered a benefit or a form of advantage,
regardless of whether consent was obtained or whether the process involved
"adding to the property of another" or "saving another from expense or
'
loss. 3

°

This particular concept of benefit has also been used to apply theories of

unjust enrichment to controversies of public concern, 31 such as class action
35
34
cases involving tobacco, 32 lead, 33 guns, asbestos, and water pollution.
These cases involve dangerous products, where the sellers have misled the
public or avoided expenses that would make the product or its disposal
safer, and "all seek disgorgement of what the defendant has gained or saved

28 See Rajinder Kaul Aff. 12-16, Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst.,
Inc., (S.D. Fla. 2003) (No. 02-22244-Civ-Moreno).
29. Id.
30. RESTATEMENT FIRST, supra note 9, § I cmt. b.
31. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 7, at 905.
32. Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228, F.3d 429, 446-47 (3d Cir. 2000).
33. See, e.g., State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n., No. 99-5226, 2001 R. I. Super. LEXIS 37 (R.I.
Super. Ct. 2001); City of New York v. Lead Indus. Ass'n., 222 A.D.2d 119 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996).
34. See, e.g., City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 12 Mass. L. Rep. 225 (Mass.
Super. Ct. 2000); White v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 816 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
35. Branch v. Mobil Oil Corp., 778 F. Supp. 35 (D. Okla. 1991).
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by not reimbursing harm caused by the products put into commerce. -3
In such cases, motions to dismiss fail in the face of general principles of
restitution,- which recognize the "the unjustness of a company's failure to
'internalize externalities."-" These cases are potentially of great interest
with regard to the benefit analysis in future cases of unjust enrichment and
the patenting of human genetic material. Whether, as in the Greenberg
case, the specific harm of secret patenting occurs 39 or whether the harms
created by the exclusionary patenting of human genetic material are
generic, a duty to abate the potential costs of these harms could potentially
be established by these precedents. Where profits made by those utilizing
human gene patents result from the potential defendants avoiding the
internalization of the costs of such patenting, these savings potentially
represent a benefit in terms of the cause of action.
Historically, a claim of unjust enrichment required that the enrichment of
4
the defendant be at the expense of or cause detriment to the plaintiff. 0
However, this requirement has been generally rejected and today a
defendant may be unjustly enriched where he realizes a benefit even4 if the
plaintiff has not suffered an actual loss or a corresponding equal loss. '

The concept has significance not only when a benefit is acquired through
a "wrongful transfer," but also where gain or profits are obtained
independent of a transfer. Recent cases dealing with corporate corruption

36. Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 7, at 913. In the gun cases, the plaintiff cities were
found to be paying the costs of the defendants' "'externalities," i.e., the costs of failing to
incorporate safety devices into the guns and negligent market practices. Thus, these savings
to the manufacturers were found to be a benefit. In cases dealing with costs related to lead
or lead paint, where the defendants were not paying for the damages associated with the lead
or lead products, the "States' lead-related expenditures" added to the defendants' advantage
or saved them from loss.
37. Id. at 913, 918-20 ("It must be noted... that plaintiffs do not survive motions to
dismiss in the majority of dangerous product restitution cases.") One dangerous products
case, Allegheny Gen. Hosp.. 228, F.3d at 446 (3d. Cir 2000) (citing Steamfitters Local
Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc.,171 F.3d 912, 936-37 (3d. Cir 1999))
found there was no duty for a tobacco company to pay for the resultant health care costs. In
the same case, the court also discussed the remoteness of the harm of the product in
reasoning that the alleged benefit to the tobacco company was not unjust.
38. Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 7, at 913.
39. See Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064
(S.D. Fla. 2003).
40. FISCHER, supra note 17, at 317 (citing GEORGE PALMER, LAW OF RESTITUTION § 2.6
(1978)).
41. Id. (citing PALMER, supra note 40, at § 2.10; RESTATEMENT FIRST § 150 (1937)). In
Edwards v. Lee's Admin., 96 S.W.2d 1028 (Ky. Ct. App. 1936), an underground cave was
developed as a tourist attraction by the defendant, where an inaccessible one-third of the
cave was owned by the plaintiff. In that case, profits received, rather than sustained
damages, was the basis for recovery in unjust enrichment.
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42
The idea
and insider trading provide illustrations of this phenomenon.
that no
the
possibility
as
as
well
a
loss,
with
correspond
not
need
gain
that
unjust
of
a
claim
transfer has occurred, might be particularly useful to
enrichment in the basic context of patenting human genetic material.
Where any specific detriment might be too attenuated or difficult to
quantify, a distinctive feature of the remedy is that liability is based on and
recovery is usually measured by the benefit to the defendant rather than the
plaintiff's loss.
In situations where the benefit has been provided, issues arise as to
whether the benefit must be conferred under circumstances that created an
expectation of payment or compensation on the plaintiffs part. When
goods or services are provided for the plaintiffs own benefit to obtain a
business advantage, for example, no unjust enrichment exists. 43 Although
some courts require this expectation, some limit it to actions of quasicontract.4 4 Others do not require it as part of the prima facie case. Clearly,
some circumstances oftentimes do not require such an expectation, such as
when property is given as a gift by mistake. In any of these situations,
courts may find the question relevant as to whether the retention of the
benefit would be considered inequitable.4 5
The general limiting principle of the broad interpretation of a "benefit"
reiterates this theme, where the terms 'volunteer" or "officious
intermeddler" are used to justify a denial of an unjust enrichment claim." It
is difficult to surmise what "officiousness" is from definitional standards.
The Restatement of Restitution provides that "officiousness means
interference in the affairs of others not justified by the circumstances under
w\hich the interference takes place.'
Courts have clarified its meaning,

42. Koxacic-Fleischer, supra note 7, at 909-15 (discussing Newby v. Enron Corp., 18 F.
Supp. 2d 684. 692 (S.D. Tex. 2002); SEC v. Yun, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292 (M.D. Fla.
2001 )). In SEC v. Yun. only the tippee and not the tipper profited from an illegal, inside
trade, yet the court found these profits could be disgorged jointly and severally. The court
presumed that even where the gain was potential, rather than actual, the defendant had
received an "intangible unjust enrichment from the insider trading scheme" where no actual
transfer had occurred and no corresponding loss had ensued.
43. Sec, e.g., Tooltrend, Inc. v. CMT Utensili SRL, 198 F.3d 802, 807 (11 th Cir. 1999).
44
FISCHER, supra note 17, at 310-11 (citing Yoh v. Daniel, 497 S.E.2d 392, 394 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1998) and noting that a claim for unjust enrichment does not require a showing of
the anticipation of compensation).
45. Id. at 311. In the Tooltrend case, two companies sold identical products with the
same name after the distribution agreement disintegrated. The plaintiffs alleged that their
advertising and promotion costs would be an unjust benefit to the other company if that
company was declared the rightful owner of the name. The court reasoned, however, that
the plaintiffs were only advertising and promoting to make a profit, thus it was not
considered an inequitable retention ofa benefit.
46
See FISCHER, supra note 17, at 305.
47. RESTATEMENT FIRST, supra note 9, § 2.
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such as the Idaho state appellate court which defines officiousness as
characteristic of "a person who, without request, at his own insistence, and
without a valid reason, confers a benefit upon another [and thus] is not
entitled to restitution." 4
Cases reflect the volunteer-officious meddler principles. One acting to
protect his own legal interests, even where no legal liability exists, is not a
volunteer.
An example would be an insurance company making a
settlement payment when it is potentially liable for a claim, even though the
claim is nonexistent.4 One who acts out of a legal obligation is similarly
not deemed to be a volunteer. " However, an individual motivated by a
moral, rather than legal, duty or desire to protect his own interests is usually
described as a volunteer.
Rescuers are thus considered volunteers.
However, recovery is not precluded where one mistakenlv believes one has
a moral obligation to act and does so.51
This limiting principle is arguably a possible defense in litigation
regarding the harms and effects of patenting human genetic material .
Giving one's tissue for the cause of medical research implicates the
volunteer principle. Howe\ er, proof of donative intent could be required to
support the giving of a benefit as a "'gift." Where the genetic material has
been given without consent or without knowledge that the practice of
patenting will result in profit to the defendant, the question of whether the
conferral of the benefit was done voluntarily or as the result of officious
intermeddling is raised.
B. An Inequitable or Unjust Retention of the Benefit:
The third element of the cause of action provides the critical issue in

48. FISCHER, supra note 17, at 305 (citing Curtis '. Becker, 941 P.2d 350, 354 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1997)).
49. See id. at 306 (discussing Perkins V. Worzala, 143 N.W.2d 516, 518 (Wis. 1966)).
50. Id. (discussing In re Monarch Capital Corp., 163 B. R. 899, 908 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1994)). In Monarch Capital, a business broker called a prospective buyer regarding the
debtor's subsidiary after an involuntary bankruptcy petition had been filed against a debtor.
The call led to the sale. The court held that the broker v. as entitled to restitution for his postpetition services because he was bound by his pre-petition contract with the debtor, yet he
was unable to obligate the bankrupt estate under contract to do anything other than pay
expenses incurred after the bankruptcy was ordered.
51.
See FISCHER, supra note 17, at 307-08 (discussing Deskovick v. Porzio, 187 A.2d
610 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1963), wherein the court found unjust enrichment had
occurred when children paying their father's hospital bills based on the mistaken belief that
he could not afford to pay them).
52. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d
1064, 1073 (S.D. Fla. 2003) ("Defendants contend ... furthermore, the Plaintiffs received
what they sought-the successful isolation of the Canavan gene and the development of a
screening test.").
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cases of the unjust enrichment claim. This issue is "identifying those forms
of enrichment that the law treats as 'unjust' for purposes of imposing

liability., 5

The scope of the equitable principle is that the retention of a

benefit is unjust when it violates the fundamental principles of justice,
equity and good conscience. 54 It is difficult to draw bright lines and the
decision-making is fact-specific: "everything depends on the circumstances
of the individual case."
Thus, divergent rationales emerge in the cases,
w\hich follow the fundamental principles, but also reveal how these
concepts of fairness and justice are malleable and amorphous. These
scenarios provide analogies and possible precedents for finding that the
retention of a benefit in cases dealing with patenting human genetic
material is inequitable where the legality of obtaining a patent does not

preclude the possibility of an unjust enrichment.56
Broad considerations of morality often provide a rationale for fulfilling
the third element of the claim in cases dealing with cohabitation scenarios. 57
A similarly broad and amorphous rationale for the finding of an inequity is
found in cases where windfalls have similar moral underpinnings. 58
Windfalls include the issuing of overpayments. 59 These cases are not
precise as to why the retention of a windfall is specifically unjust. Instead,
they are stated as innate and presumptive, illustrating that the enrichment
can be legally justifiable but nonetheless considered unjust. 60 Thus, broad
and traditional notions of equity inform the determination of whether the
retention of a benefit is unjust. It is often the case that only considerations
53. RESTATE\IF \T THIRD, supra note 9, § I cmt. b.
54
Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1072.
55. Moore Handley, Inc. x.Major Realty Corp., 340 So. 2d 1238, 1238 (1976).
56
See Chou v. Univ. of Chicago, 254 F.3d 1347, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing
claim for unjust enrichment in context of gene patent dispute).
57. See, e.g., Sharp v. Kosmalski, 351 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 1976); Kozlowski v.
Kozlowski, 395 A.2d 913, 916-18 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978). In Kozlowski, the judge
asked: "Is there any remedy available under our law for a woman who has devoted 15 or
more years living with a man..." Id. at 916. The court noted that "quasi-contract is ...a
legal concept rationalizing a sanction to prevent unjust enrichment based upon the equitable
principle that whatsoever it is certain that a man ought to do, the law supposes him to have
promised to do." Id. at 918.)
58. See Saporta v. Saporta, 766 So. 2d 379, 381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (recognizing,
upon divorce, an implied promise that a home bought with funds that were previously
transferred between husband and wife prior to marriage would be for the family and that if a
constructive trust of the house was not given to the woman, the resultant windfall for the
husband would amount to an unjust enrichment).
59. See, e.g., Sharff, Wittmer & Kurtz, P. A. v. Messana, 581 So.2d 906, 907-8 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
60. Id. at 907 (reviewing a claim of unjust enrichment where plaintiff received payments
from a settlement agreement from a negligently prepared tax form, as well as an IRS
payment resulting from the negligence).
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of 'good conscience' would disallow the retention of the benefit.
In potential cases of unjust enrichment and the patenting of human
genetic material, the existence of a patent oftentimes creates and allows for
windfalls. Although there is an incentive system in individual cases, profits
arising from patents are not necessarily tied to effort. Thus, the retention of
the profits arising from these patents potentially creates an inequity which
could be considered to be unjust. An irretrievable loss to a plaintiff can also
be determinative in establishing that the retention of a benefit is
inequitable. 6' When a patent on human genetic material results in the
gene's exclusive use or restricts it through licensing, an irretrievable loss
has occurred.
More specific rationales also exist as the basis for fulfilling the third
element of the prima facie case. In past cases, unjust enrichment was found
when excessixe profits haxe resulted in the finding of inequity. For
example, overcharging residents of a nursing home constituted
overreaching and "would equitably require the return of excess payments
made."6'
Where contracts are non-existent, the use of overreaching to
describe excessive relies upon an unstated concept of equity. Illustrated in
Hall v. Humana Hospital, plaintiffs brought a class action suit to recover
alleged overcharges for pharmaceuticals and medical supplies and pled both
common law and statutory counts of unjust enrichment.63 Examples of
these overcharges included a charge of $11.50 for a single Zantac tablet, a
charge of $52.00 for one Tylenol with codeine, and a charge of $20.50 for
each individual Cipro tablet."'
A case that was settled out of court provides a similar hypothetical in the
area of pharmaceuticals, excessive profits, and unjust enrichment.6s In
1989, Boots Pharmaceuticals commissioned Betty Dong, a clinical
pharmacist, to compare its treatment for hypothyroidism, Synthroid, with
cheaper alternatives made by other companies . Synthroid had been used
61.
See Duncan v. Kasim. 810 So. 2d 968, 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that
the inability to remove fixtures constituted unjust enrichment when plaintiff personally bore
all expenses to improve a space in a lodge where she operated a bar although the
management of the premises was illegal due to the fact that she was a convicted felon and
the defendant appropriated all of the personal property).
62. See Greenfield v. Manor Care Inc., 705 So. 2d 926, 931 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
63. See Hall v.Humana Hosp., 686 So. 2d 653, 653 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
64. Id. at 655-58 (affirming the partial summary judgment for the defendants because
the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover the alleged overcharges and because the payments
which had been made resulted from a mistake of law concerning the enforceability of a
previous contract made with the defendant).
65. See Michael Day, He Who Pays the Piper. NEW Sci. MAG., May 9, 1998,
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mgl5821333.100 (discussing a suit where users of the
drug Synthroid sued Knoll Pharmaceuticals).
66. Id.
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by millions of patients and was the drug most recommended by physicians.
6' A complete switch to the less expensive brands would have saved the
U.S. Health department $365 million a year. When the study showed that
Synthroid was no better than the alternative drugs tested, the company that
bought Boots, Knoll Pharmaceuticals, withdrew a paper that was about to
be published in the Journal of the American Medical Association
("JAMA"), claiming the research was "fundamentally flawed., 69 The paper
was finally published in JAMA in 1997 and the users of Synthroid sued
In future cases of
Knoll, which settled out-of-court for $98 million.
patenting human genetic material, where pre-negotiated contracts are nonexistent between the parties, principles of equity could determine that
profits accrued from the patenting of human genetic material are excessive
and that defendants have been overreaching.
Social and political motivations exist, described perhaps as public policy
rationales, in many cases upholding claims of unjust enrichment under the
federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). 71 In such
cases, public health concems result from the practice of patenting and
profits accrued from the practice could be considered inequitable.
With potential implications for claims of unjust enrichment in the
patenting of human genetic material, a federal district court decided a case
of unjust enrichment within the specific context of the "secret" patenting of
an invention. 72 L'niver.itv of Colorado Foundation v.American Cyanamid

Compan' specifically dealt with doctors who developed a method for
reformulating prenatal supplements with the intent that the Cyanamid
company would use their work to manufacture and profit from the sale of
an improved product.73 They also intended however, to publish their work,
allowing other manufacturers of the product to use these findings.74 The
court found that "Cyanamid removed the reformulation technology from the
free marketplace of ideas ... thwarting what the doctors intended freely to

convey, (namely) a complete and definite research idea for reformulating
67

Id.

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Solomon, 996 F. Supp. 1473, 1475 (1998).
See also Heller v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 145 F.3d 487, 495 (D.C. 1998) (finding that a
disability payment following a determination that Heller was not qualified to receive
disability anymore constituted unjust enrichment and would "be a cost unfairly borne by the
other members of the plan").
72. See Univ. of Colo. Found. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 153 F. Supp. 2d. 1231 (D. Colo.
2001).
73. Id. at 1233-43
74. Id. at 1243.
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prenatal supplements that would inure to the benefit of all .. .not just
Cyanamid." 75 The court thus held that "a defendant who uses a benefit
provided by the plaintiff in an unauthorized and unfair manner may be
liable in Colorado for unjust enrichment. 76
Thus, a broad range of factual circumstances and varying rationales
illustrates whether the retention of a benefit proves to be inequitable.
Ascertaining equity might aid judges in particularizing justice and avoiding
the application of rigid rules as a legal principle based on morality and
fairness. 77 Either way, courts will continue to assess whether or not the
retention of the benefit is unjust. The equitable nature of unjust enrichment
will certainly be definitive in the context of arguments against the patenting
of human genetic material. The case of Greenberg is indicative of its
potentially far-reaching scope and broad application.
IV. UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND THE GREENBERG CASE

The original decision in Greenberg, which upheld the unjust enrichment
claim, led to a settlement, although further rulings on the issue might have
provided even more evidence and law to bolster the arguments against the
commercialization of human genetic material through exclusive patenting
rights. Nevertheless, the value of the practice by which these patents are
obtained was clearly questioned in the decision, which concerned itself with
"a tale of a successful research collaboration gone sour.
The plaintiffs consisted of a group of parents whose children died from
the rare genetic Canavan disease and various nonprofit organizations who
had helped these parents in their endeavors to find a test and cure for the
disease, including the Canavan Foundation, National Tay-Sachs and Allied
Disease Association, and Dor Yeshorim, a group providing screening and
counseling services to members of the Jewish community. 79 In 1987,
Daniel Greenberg contacted Dr. Reuben Matalon, a co-defendant, and
requested his assistance in locating the gene responsible for disease in order
to develop both carrier and prenatal genetic testing."
The plaintiffs
continuously provided Dr. Matalon with vital tissue samples, financial

75. Id. (citing Univ. of Colo. Found. v. Am. Cyanamid Co. 974 F. Supp. 1339, 1354
(D. Colo. 1997) [hereinafter Cyanamid III];
Unix. of Colo. Found. v. Am. Cyanamid Co.,
105 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1183 (D. Colo. 2000) [hereinafter CvanamidlV].

76.

Id. at 1234.

77. See Sherwin, supra note 12, at 2085 (describing principles of equity as potentially
derived from these three distinct philosophical and jurisprudential approaches).
78. Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064,
1066 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
79. Id. at 1067

80.

Id. at 1066
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support, and aid in identifying the location of Canavan families
internationally, as well as creating a Canavan registry, a confidential
database and compilation with critical epidemiological, medical, and other
information about the families. 8' The plaintiffs' understanding of the
potential outcome of this collaboration was that any carrier or prenatal
testing developed using such research would be provided on an affordable
and accessible basis. The plaintiffs also expected that Matalon's research
would remain in the public domain to promote the discovery of more
effective prevention techniques and treatment and, eventually, to effectuate
a cure for the disease itself. 83
In 1990, Matalon became associated with co-defendant Miami
Children's Hospital and continued the relationship with the plaintiffs,
accepting both tissue samples and financial support.X4 In 1993, Matalon
and his team successfully isolated the gene responsible for Canavan disease.
Buoyed by these findings, the plaintiffs continued to supply resources to the
team. - In September 1994, the defendants submitted a patent application
for the identified genetic sequence, as well as any related activities,
including carrier and prenatal testing, gene therapy and other treatments,
and research involving the gene and its mutations.86 The patent was finally
issued in 1997.87 The plaintiffs alleged that they had no knowledge either
of the plan to seek a patent, or the actual filing, and that they first were
made aware of it in November 1998 .' At that time, Miami Children's
Hospital threatened to curb ongoing tests for Canavan disease through the
use of restrictive licensing and the collection of royalty fees, thus increasing
the cost of screening and limiting the number of laboratories that could
perform the test.89
The court did not grant a motion to dismiss the count of unjust
enrichment after the complaint was viewed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiffs. 90 The opinion in the case adheres to the traditional roots of
unjust enrichment in its reasoning, finding that "the retention of the benefit
violates fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.""

81.
82.
83.

Id.
at 1067

84
85.
86.
87.
x8.
89.
90.
91.

Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. at 1067.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1067-68
Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. at 1068-77.
Id. at 1072.

Id.
Id.
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Although the Restatement was not cited, the outline of the discussion
followed the definitional principle that "A person who has been unjustly
enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the
other.""'
The court quickly determined that a benefit had been conferred and
acknowledged.93 The defendants' downfall, despite the assertion that the
gene had been isolated and a test had been developed, was the unauthorized
use of the benefit. 4 If the plaintiffs had known of the defendants' intent to
patent the genetic material, they would not have provided the benefit. 95 The
defendants described the profits from the patenting as a "reimbursement"
for the time and investment required by the research.96 However, the judge
felt that the plaintiffs could make the same claim and ruled that the
retention of the benefit resulting from "a continuing research
collaboration""' where "more than just a donor-donee relationship was

alleged" is inequitable."
The brief and distinct conclusion relied on the broad equitable scope of
unjust enrichment.9 9 Considerations of fairness prevailed as the court
refused to dismiss the claim based on the general context of the case,
despite its rejection of the common law tort claims.' 00 The "unauthorized"
use of the genetic information wvas not found to be determinative of the
other civil wrongs alleged in the case: lack of informed consent, fraudulent
concealment, misappropriation of trade secrets, conversion, or breach of a
fiduciary duty.'0 '
Had liability been established in those contexts,
restitution as a remedial response could have been imposed to prevent an
unjust enrichment from occurring. The judge declined to extend a "duty of
informed consent to the researcher's economic interests"''0 2 and yet the lack
of disclosure to the plaintiffs of the defendants' intent to patent and profit
from the research was considered unjust. 0 3 Some undefined, inexplicable
wrong had occurred at the plaintiffs' expense and while it did not rise to the
level of a tort because of the wrong, the retention of the profits could be

92.
93.
94.

RESTATEMENT FIRST, supra note 9, § I cmt. a.
Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1072.
Id.

95.
96.

Id.
Id.

97.

Id.

98.

Id.

99. See Greenberg,264 F. Supp. 2d. at 1077.
100. See id.
101.
Id.
102. Id. at 1070.

103.

Id. at 1071.
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considered inequitable. 114
The historic and traditional gap-filling nature of the substantive cause of
action was visible in this case and thus significant for deciding future cases
involving the patenting of human genetic material. Although the actual
patenting of the genetic material was strictly legal, the denial of the
contributions of the donors represented an injustice, the underlying basis for
liability. Although certainly inconclusive and fact specific, the initial
opinion represents an opening for challenges to the patenting of human
genetic material even where the practice itself has been conducted within
the confines of tort, contract, and property law.
Had the case proceeded to trial, certain defenses would have been
predictable. One example involves invoking the general limiting principle
and that the plaintiffs acted as volunteers or officious intermeddlers would
have been suggested. The argument would assert that the conferral of the
benefit arose from some general sense of duty, a donation unsolicited,
derived from a moral, rather than legal obligation. Similarly, it might be
suggested that a relevant consideration as to whether the retention of the
benefit was unjust would be the question of whether in conferring the
benefit, the plaintiffs had no expectation of payment or compensation in
return and that they conferred the benefit gratuitously.
Thus, it has been posited that the case could have been decided within
the narrower parameters of the cause of action as defined by the most recent
edition of the Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 0 5 which
concerns itself with the "anomalous transfers that cannot be justified by the
terms of a valid and enforceable exchange transaction; by the intention of
the transferor to make a gift; or by the existence of a legal duty to the
transferee."' " " In hypothesizing a court's potential response, it would be
difficult to qualify the conferral of the benefits as gifts or to surmise that the
plaintiffs had no expectations in return for the conferral of tissue, money
and time. Rather, the facts confirm that this was a collaborative research
effort where the plaintiffs expected an affordable and accessible test for
Canavan disease, as well as the possibility of continuing efforts to discover
a cure.
Whatever the outcome might have been in this case, the law establishing
the cause of action for unjust enrichment under these certain circumstances
has great value as a precedent for those questioning the practice of patenting
human genetic material for material gain. It is possible that parties who

104. Id. at 1073.
105. See Mary R. Anderlik & Mark A. Rothstein, Canavan Decision Favors
Researchers Over Families, 31 J.L. MED. & ETItCS 450, 452 (2003).
106. Id. (citing RESTAIENIENi THIRD, supra note 9, § I cmt. b).
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would not have given their genetic material to researchers if they had
known of the intent to patent and profit from such research, and such intent
had remained undisclosed, could become potential plaintiffs. Additionally,
parties who give their genetic material for the purpose of research in a
collaborative effort and are excluded from the resulting fruits of the
collaboration could sue the patent-holders. Under these circumstances, the
retention of benefits could be considered inequitable under Greenberg.
Furthermore, such a result could rest on the narrow distinction that these
benefits were not merely gifts. Instead, broad, flexible, and far-reaching
equitable principles inherent in the cause of action would dictate that an
unjust enrichment had occurred.
V.

THE EFFECTS OF PATENTS ON HUMAN GENETIC MATERIAL AND
CLAIMS OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT

In considering the use of the claim of unjust enrichment within the
context of patenting human genetic material, certainly the facts described in
the Greenberg case are distinctive. The plaintiffs instigated the scientific
research and continuously provided the genetic materials that eventually
resulted in profits for the defendants.'0 7 Nonetheless, the rationale behind
the claim's survival may provide a basis for legal challenges made by
individual plaintiffs or classes of plaintiffs responding to the enrichment of
those involved in the practice of patenting human genetic material. The
practice could be challenged based upon the effects it has upon the dignitary
concerns of individuals or groups in society: as an innately unfair societal,
religious, or political construct. Another challenge could be that the effects
of patenting human genetic material are detrimental to the health care of an
individual or that it acts as an impediment to progress in medical research
and gains in health care for the general public. In these situations, as well
as in situations where an unauthorized use of human genetic material has
occurred, unjust enrichment exists as a basis for liability.
A. The Effects of Human Genetic MaterialPatents and Human Dignity

Patent law is based upon a distinction between products that are manmade and those existing in nature.' 0 8 The U.S. Supreme Court, in Diamond
v. Chakrabary, explained that "anything under the sun that is made by
man" may be patented.'0 9 Starting in the 1990s, the first applications for
patents based on human DNA were filed, followed by biotechnology firms

107.
108.
109.

See Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1072-73.
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1980).
See id. at 309.
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rushing to submit applications claiming DNA sequences." 0 Critics charged
that these patents were being granted too liberally. As a result, the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") promulgated interim "Utility
Guidelines" in December 1999, with a final that followed in January 2001
to assist in the evaluating the validity of patent applications."' The call for
public comment on the proposed guidelines resulted in heated debates
prompted by general concerns over the patenting of genetic material, human
DNA in particular. 12
The PTO responded unfavorably to arguments that genes were products
of nature, and thus incapable of being patented." 3 The agency found that
"the inventor's discovery of a gene can be the basis for a patent of the
genetic composition isolated from its natural state and processed through
purifying steps that separate the gene from other molecules naturally
associated with it. , '4 The PTO's construction of this technical process
"separates the genetic material itself from nature" and "draws the line
between nature and artifice," that is to say, what can be seen not as a
scientific process, but a legal one." 5 Thus, despite the fact that courts have
determined that genetic material "is profoundly the essence of one's human
uniqueness,"'1 6 patent law currently dictates that our genetic information is
an object for commercialization.
Social norms provide broad arguments against such commercialization,
xherein "human dignity is threatened precisely because it commodifies
something that science tells us is essential to human identity."' 17 In these
110. S, Kahn, supra note 1,at 420-21. The article discusses arguments expressed
during debates around proposed revisions to the Utility Guidelines issued by the U. S. Patent
and Trademark Office ("PTO") and argues that dignitary concerns were dismissed by the

PTO in favor of market approaches.

The article describes Craig Venter's original

application for over 6800 partial complementary DNA (cDNA) sequences called "express
sequence tags" (ESTs), as well as subsequent applications from firms such as Celera

Genomics (applications for over 20,000 gene sequences) and Incyte Genomics (holding
patents for over 400 genes with applications pending, as of this \ Titing, for another 10,000).
The article states, "[c]urrently, over three million genome-related patent applications have
been filed with the PTO," citing U.S. Dep't of Energy, Human Genome Project Information:
Genetics and Patenting (2001), http://www.ornl.gov/hgmisielsi/patents.html.
111. Id. at 417.
112. Seeid. at421.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 426 (quoting Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan.
5, 2001 )).
115. Id,
116. Kahn, supra note I, at 422 (quoting Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal.
Rptr. 494, 508 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)).
117. Id. at 423 (quoting Ted Peters, Intellectual Property and Human Dignity, in THE
GENETiC FRONTIER: ETtics, LAW, AND POLICY 215, 220-21 (Mark S. Frankel & Albert Teich
eds., 1994) (arguing that notions of human dignity may discourage the patenting of human
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discussions the gene is an embodiment of human identity while the patent,
an incursion not unlike slavery, results in ownership rights of man's
common heritage to either individuals or corporations. 11
The patenting of human genes proves problematic for indigenous peoples
who do not subscribe to Western notions of property, but instead view
genetic identity as intrinsic to all peoples." 9 According to a spokesperson,
-[o]wnership is resisted not only in the name of the human subjects who
supply the genetic material but also in the name of all generations, past and
20
future, who are implicated, and hence somehow present in the germline."'
Objections to the practice based on religious grounds also exist, 2 as do
generic social concerns. Human DNA is very much implicated in the
"perennial moral concern in Western thought, whatever the ideological
position of the thinker, about the commoditization of human attributes such
as labor, intellect, or creativity, or, more recently, human organs, female
reproductive capacity and ova."' -, 2
These arguments did not hold great weight with the PTO, where the
purification and isolation techniques sever human genetic material from its
innate humanity and where all genetic material is treated just like any other
chemical. The PTO has reiterated that patents do not confer ownership but
rather exclusionary rights and genes subjected to being patented, in any
event, have been separated from any connection to the human subject
through scientific processes. - This legal power ignores dignitary concerns
despite the fact that the individual himself does not experience the scientific
"cleansing" process. The dignitary concerns of an individual or societal
group are irrelevant when "[a]n individual subject is denied any claims or
connection to her genetic material once it enters a lab where the legalscientific process of purification and isolation eclipses all previous genetic

ties."124
Although this supposition is relevant for challenges to initial patenting, it

genes, as the human person should not be subordinated to other values).
118. Seeid. at424.
119. See id; see also Sturges, supra note 1, at 244-45 (arguing that less developed
countries are especially wary of the ability to patent human genetic material, believing that
such patenting "reduces human life to a commodity and amounts to tampering with nature").
120. See Public Comments on the United States Patent and Trademark Office: Revised
Interim Utility Examination Guidelines, Comment 39, 65 Fed. Reg. 3425 (Jan. 21, 2000),
available at http.,/www.uspto.gov./ seb/offices/com/sol/comments/utilguide/ipcb.pdf
121. See Sturges, supra note 1, at 244-45.
122. Kahn, supra note 1, at 423 (quoting Igor Kopytoff, The Cultural Biography of
Things. Commoditization as Process in

THE SOCIAL LIFE OF THINGS: COMMODITIES IN

CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 64, 84 (Arjun Appadurai ed., 1986)).

123.
124.

Id. at 425-27.
Id. at 434-44.
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is arguable that such dignitary concerns could be vindicated in a substantive
claim of unjust enrichment. In such a case, the stripping or cleansing
process itself, which results in genetic material capable of patenting, would
not be at issue. It is not the exclusivity or ownership per se which is in
dispute, but rather the inequity that results. Where unjust enrichment filled
gaps in the tort laws cited in Greenberg,it is potentially available to remedy
the harms created, but not addressed by intellectual property law, where the
appropriation of one's genetic identity violates cultural, spiritual, or
religious mores and freedoms.
B. The Effects of PatentingHuman Genetic Material on Health Care
Numerous and diverse arguments suggest that the patenting of human
genetic material impedes medical research and is a potential threat to
human health. 12 These assertions could also provide a basis upon which
courts could sustain claims of unjust enrichment, whether brought by
societal groups challenging the practice as detrimental to public health or by
individual plaintiffs where specific medical harms are at issue.
Some critics focus on the basic detriment resulting from the acquisition
of the patent, while others assert that at certain points in the scientific
process the patent becomes more detrimental. Francis Collins, director of
the Human Genome Project, expressed concern that "putting toll booths on
basic science" will stifle the progress that these patents are meant to
encourage. 2(
Frequent commentators Michael A. Heller and Rebecca
Eisenberg warn that -[a] proliferation of intellectual property rights
upstream may be stifling life-sustaining innovations further downstream in
the course of research and product development."-12 These arguments thus
share the fundamental premise that broad patents have negative
consequences.
Professor Lori B. Andrews has discussed the ramifications of genetic
patenting and categorized the harms produced.'
These include the
impediments to research, problems in verification resulting from the
exclusivity of the patent-holder, the resultant deterrence to innovation based
on the patenting of gene fragments and multiple holders of rights, and the
problems created by excess rights being granted to the original holder of a
patent. -9 Other harms include the actual damage to health care created by
125. See, e.g..
Andrews, supra note 2, at 79-81.
126. See Hill, supra note 2, at 241 (citing Ken Garber, Homestead 2000: The Genome,
SIGNALS, Mar. 3, 2000, available at http://www.signalsmagazine.com/signalsmag.nsf/o/
FD168 FB6C42ACF6E882568950015E2D0).
127. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 698.
128. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 79-96.
129. Id.at 80-96.
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patents, such as restricted access to testing, the potentially inadequate
quality of testing, the potential upset in the traditional physician-patient
An
relationship, and the drain on resources in the area of training. 3
examination of the implications of human gene patenting illuminates the
potential for a Variety of plaintiffs to apply the broad concepts of equity in
claims of unjust enrichment against potential defendant patent holders.
Because of human genetic patenting, scientists and researchers become
reluctant to share materials, data, and information as profit motives create a
basic impediment to research.13' For example, research for diseases such as
autism is hindered if tissue samples are not shared. 1 32 As a result of the
commercialization of research, publication of information likewise is
delayed or withheld.133 Cooperation between scientists is diminished
because of intentional withholding of data, 1 4 while the troubling prospect
of the impossibility of duplicating published research arises. 135
Research may further be impeded where, because of patents, results are
not subject to verification.'-" A patent holder may exclude others from
evaluating and duplicating his research and can require licensing for further
study of a genetic indicator of a disease, such as a mutation, within a
population. Thus, claims of the original patent holder as to the prevalence
of such an indicator cannot be verified.' 37 A rush to profit from the genetic
testing that ensues oftentimes occurs without enough data to confirm the
This restriction on
accuracy of the predictability of such testing. 3'
verification can also create problems in the realm of forensic DNA

testing. 139
The existence of patents on small fragments of genes, known as Express
Sequence Tags, creates multiple rights-holders and high transaction costs,
further impeding innovation."" Various biotechnological firms such as
ncyte and Hyseq are patenting and have applied for millions of patents on

130.
131.

Id.
Id. at 80-81.

132. Id. (discussing Eliot Marshall, Whose DNA is it Anyway'. 278 SCI. 564, 564
(1997)).
133. Andrews, supra note 2, at 80-81 (discussing Mertz et al., Diagnostic Testing Fails
the Test, 415 NATURE 577, 577-79 (2002)).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 82 (discussing Blumenthal et al., Data Withholding in Academic Genetics,
473 JAMA 473, 477 (2002)).
136. Id. at 81.
137. Id. at 81-82.

138.

Id.

139. Andrews, supra note 2, at 82.
140. Id. at 83 (citing Donald L. Zuhn, Jr., DNA Patentability Shutting the Door to the
Utility Requirement, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 973, 981 (2001)).
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these segments, where a partial segment of a gene could potentially be
useful.14 ' Richard Gibbs, the director of the Human Genome Sequencing
Center, analogizes this phenomenon to a land-grabbing: "Most of us are
enthusiastic about oil drillers or gold miners who work their own patch and
of territory
discover riches, but less enthusiastic about the vast amounts
' 42
it.'
in
what's
about
knowledge
real
any
without
being claimed
Thus, a researcher exploring a cure for breast cancer would have to
negotiate "with not only the patent holder for the full BRCA1 and BRCA2
genes, but with all of the other holders of patents who had discovered and
patented any of the hundreds of other mutations in that gene.' 43 Similarly,
the ability to create a gene therapy could be based upon a grant of
permission or the formation of contracts with numerous patent holders. A
refusal to negotiate by any one of these holders or a denial of access to
databases based on restrictive costs creates an inefficient market, where
both the 4patent
holders and potential consumers of such therapy would be
4
1
harmed.
Oftentimes too many rights are granted to the holder of an original patent
on a gene. 45 The original owner can thus restrict its use or require costly
licensing fees from a subsequent researcher.
This is particularly
problematic where small gene fragments, whose46functions are unknown, are
patented, such as in the case of AIDS research.
A company applied for a patent on a genetic sequence related to a
receptor, while at the same time AIDS researchers worked on a receptor
gene CCR5, which in humans produces a protein used by the HIV virus to
infect its victims. I 4' The original patent was granted to the company for the
receptor HDGNR1O and "all possible embodiments associated with the
receptor."' 48 This receptor turned out to be the same as receptor CCR5 and
the original applicant, unaware of the implication for AIDS research,
141.

Id. at 84 (citing Garber, supra note 126).

142.

See The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast Mar. 1, 2000)

(transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/health/jan-june0O/genomesharing_

3-16.html (last visited Apr. 7. 2006)).
143.
144.

Andrews, supra note 2,at 85.
Id.
145.
Id. (citing CARL SHAPIRO, NAVIGATING THE PATENT THICKET: CROSS LICENSES,
PATENT POOLS AND STANDARD-SETTING, INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 121 (Mar.
2001 ), availableat http://www.haas.berkeley.edu./shapiro/thicket.pdf).
146. Id. at 87.
147. Id. (citing Nathan Seppa, Anti-HIV Mutation Poses Hepatitis Risk, ScI. NEWS, Feb.

24, 2001, at 127 (discussing how a mutated CCR5 creates a defective receptor protein so that
HIV is unable to enter and attack the cell)).
148. Id. at 87 (citing Pat Carson & Melissa Mandrgoc, Gene-Based Drugs Challenge
Patent Process Statutory Requirements May Help to Address Concerns Over Applications
Filed on DNA Sequences, 226 N.Y.L.J. 73 (2001)).
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retained exclusive rights. 4 Thus, the company could license and charge
others for therapies or tests utilizing the CCR5 gene. One such party was
the National Institutes of Health, which had previously been studying the
gene, but was now excluded from research.' 50 In these instances, patents
awarded early in the scientific process, or "upstream" patents, create
disincentives to further discovery of potential health benefits.'15
The patent regime also impacts access to and the quality of testing for
genetic disease, where patent holders frequently grant either exclusive
licensing rights to their own laboratories or grant licenses to a limited
number of other laboratories. This occurred in the Greenberg case, where
the plaintiffs alleged that such practices limited accessible and affordable
tests for Canavan disease.' -' The discovery of various mutations in the
same gene causing a specific disease is also limited by this exclusionary
testing, where the mutations are difficult to find. One recent example
involves breast cancer screening. A European patent related to the BRCA1
breast cancer gene was granted to a U.S. company, Myriad Genetics.
"which covered all methods for diagnosing breast cancer by comparing a
patient's gene to the gene sequence described in the patent."' 53 The
company then insisted that all such tests for breast cancer should be sent to
its own laboratory, despite the fact Myriad's test only assessed ten to twenty
percent of the potential mutations that could be found in the gene. 54 This
move precluded the possibility that certain other mutations causing the
disease would be found. which was confirmed when a French physician
55
found a mutation in an American family missed by the Myriad test.
This granting of broad patent rights further hampers efforts in the field of
pharmaceutical
research
based
on
genetic
research,
where
"[p]harmaceutical companies can now exercise property ownership over
156
both the drug to treat a disease and the microorganism that causes it.
This exclusionary right to genetic material may also hamper research

149.

Andrews, supra note 2, at 87.

150.

Id. at 88.

151. Id.; see also Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 698.
152. Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064,
1067 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
153. Andrews, supra note 2, at 89.
154. Id. at 89-90 (discussing Steve Benowitz, French Challenge to BRCA1 Patent
UnderliesEuropean Discontent, 94 J. NAT'L. CANCER INST. 80, 80 (2002)).
155. Id. at 90 (citing Sophie Gad et al., Identification of a Large Rearrangementofthe
BRCA1 Gene Using Coulour Bar Code on Combed DNA in an American Breast/Ovarian
CancerFamily Previously Studied by Direct Sequencing, 38 J. MED. GENETICS 388 (2001)
(stating that no "BRACI or BRCA2 gene mutation was identified by direct DNA
sequencing" on an individual who had a high probability of carrying the genetic mutation)).
156. Id. at 90 (citing Krimsky, supra note 2, at 37).
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A
dealing with the development and discovery of new drugs.
pharmaceutical company might apply for a patent on a certain test in order
to determine the effectiveness of a particular drug. Then, it might neither
develop the test nor let anyone else develop it, as the use of the test could
limit the potential customers for the drug itself.157 Not only does this
imperil the health of potential users of pharmaceuticals, the process of
privatization also results in "the escalating price of pharmaceuticals and
therapeutic tests."'15
In addition to these potential concerns, it is arguable that the very nature
of the patient-physician relationship is threatened by the practice of
patenting human genetic material. 59 Where the physician is also involved
in research pursuits with financial incentives involved, the trust of his
patient is vulnerable. In Moore v.Regents of the University of California,

such concerns were alleviated by the requirement that informed consent
also include a physician's duty to disclose such financial intent, including
the intent to patent a particular cell or gene. 60 In Greenberg, the premise
wvas narrowly drawn, excluding physicians whose concerns related to
research, not therapy.' 6' Thus, with no duty to disclose such intentions,
"due to the enticing possibility of vast profits, many researchers are not
sharing tissue samples or preliminary findings" in the race to discover a
gene which might prove profitable. 6' Patients then depend upon physicianresearchers for cures to their illnesses and thus have reason for mistrust.
The desire to volunteer, to contribute to such research, is diminished by the
profit motives of those involved in such endeavors.
Finally, another concern involves the general consumption of resources.
Where the effective training of future physicians, laboratory personnel, and
scientists may be compromised by limitations on genetic testing, legal
battles involving 6patent infringement claims could lead to costly suits and
vast settlements. 1

1

157. Id. at 91 (citing Krimsky, supra note 2, at 37).
158. Krimsky, supra note 2, at 37.
159. Andrews, supra note 2, at 92-94 (discussing the implications of patenting human
genetic material and considering the cases Moore x. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal.
Rptr. 494. 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) and Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479
(Cal. 1990)).
160. Moore v.Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
161.
See Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F.Supp.2d
1064, 1069 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
162. Andrews, supra note 2, at 94.
163. Id. at 95 (discussing a patent-infringement case with a $200 million dollar
settlement).
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VI. POTENTIAXL APPLICATIONS OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT

The pool of potential plaintiffs and defendants in cases dealing with the
practice of patenting human genetic material is extensive considering the
effect upon human dignity and private and public health care. Whether

cases of unjust enrichment are brought by large societal groups or classes or
individual plaintiffs, the elements of the prima facie case can be proven
where notions of 'benefit' are broad and adherence to traditional and
flexible notions of equity determine whether the retention of the benefit is
unjust. Although not limitless, because defenses will arise and proof will
be determined by the nature of the cases, examples of potential claims
illustrate the far-reaching possibilities of the unjust enrichment claim to
deter the practice of patenting human genetic material.
A. Potential Claims of Societal Groups
1. Claims based upon dignitary concerns
Where ethical, cultural. political, religious, or spiritual concerns conflict
with the concept of patenting human genetic material, it is possible that
certain populations might prevail in litigation. Defendant biotechnology
companies that appropriate genetic material from patients or research
subjects without their consent or knowledge and then patent and profit from
their use could be liable. Suits of this nature would conform to the
definitional requirements of the Restatement of Restitution, where "a
person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required
to make restitution to another."1 64 An unauthorized use of genetic material
represents a detriment, including a loss of dignity, religious freedom, and
the essence of one's own humanity. According to the doctrine, these losses
do not have to be quantified, nor must they be derived from any particular
wrongful transfer.
Traditional, broad-based notions of equity could
determine whether the retention of these benefits is unjust.
Certainly, considerations of justice could provide the rationale for a
finding of inequity. The absence of consent to the patenting and profiting
of genetic material may be all that is needed to prove that the retention of
the benefit is unjust in potential suits invoking dignitary losses. In Edwards
v. Lee's Administrator, use of a portion of a cave was without the consent
of the owner and the plaintiffs losses were unidentifiable.161 In the
Cyanamid case the court stated, "[c]learly there is no requirement, then, that

164.
165.

See RESTATEMENT FIRST, supra note 9,§ I cmt. a.
See Edwards v. Lee's Admin., 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1033 (Ky. Ct. App. 1936).
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all patentable ideas actually be patented.' 66 The court held that "a
defendant who uses a benefit provided by the plaintiff in an unauthorized
' 67
and unfair manner may be liable in Colorado for unjust enrichment.
Where indigenous populations represent potential plaintiffs for unjust
enrichment claims against biotechnology firms, basic moral precepts could
provide a rationale for the finding of an inequity. Just as Native Americans
wvere dispossessed of their lands, "bioprospecting" and patenting genes
from isolated, indigenous populations strips those populations of their
dignity and their genetic identity. As such "[s]ome indigenous groups have
become suspicious of cell line prospecting and consider it a form of
In response, one
Western thievery of third world resources." 168
international group has been organized to respond to the question of
\\hether there is a right to profit from someone else's cell line. 169 Another
group's ethical guidelines propose "the sharing of financial rewards it might
recei\e from cell lines with the communities from whom the cell lines were
obtained."' 170 Thus, considerations of equity and morality exist in the
profiting on the unauthorized use of human biological material. The
contemporary use of unjust enrichment could perhaps circumvent demands
for massive reparations in the future.
Despite the fact that courts have established that "obtaining a patent does
not preclude the defendants from being unjustly enriched,"' 7' the use of the
claim in these cases regarding dignitary, spiritual, or religious concerns
Would unquestionably be considered novel. The potential defense that any
donation of such material might be considered a 'gift' in the context of
research (where informed consent is not extended and does not require the
disclosure of the intent to patent and profit to such donors) might preclude
its use. In turn, defendant companies could also argue that the retention of
the benefit is neither unjust nor immoral, based upon showings of
advancement in health care made available to such populations.
Nevertheless, it is exactly in such circumstances that the historically
broad and flexible aspect of the claim has been used to establish an
unidentifiable sense of moral righteousness and vindicate wrongdoing.
166.

Univ. of Colo. Found. V. Am. Cyanamid Co., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1242 n.8 (D.

Colo. 2001 ).
167.
168.

169.
170.

See id at 1243 (quoting Cvanamid IV, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 1175).
See Krimsky supra note 2, at 37.
Id. at 38 (discussing the Indigenous Peoples Coalition Against Biopiracy).
Id. (discussing a draft of the ethical guidelines for the Human Genome Diversity

Project).

171.

Set Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F.Supp.2d

1064. 1069 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (citing Chou v. Univ. of Chicago, 254 F.3d 1347, 1363 (Fed.

Cir. 2001) for recognizing a claim for unjust enrichment in the context of gene patent
dispute)).
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Exemplified by the cohabitation scenarios where the common law has
provided no other grounds for relief, unjust enrichment exists to restore
human dignity and right moral wrongs. Where a financial remedy might
not vindicate these dignitary losses, its deterrent effect on the practice of
patenting and profiting from human genetic material certainly denotes
"restitution" and the claim of unjust enrichment should prevail.
2. Claims based upon the unfair and unauthorized use of human genetic
material given by research subjects and/or providers of human genetic
material
It is not only where dignitary losses have occurred, but also in areas
dealing with medical research that the lack of consent to the patenting and
profiting from human genetic material could provide the basis for a claim in
unjust enrichment. The Greenberg case dealt with a lack of consent for
patenting and profiting from human genetic material in a scenario that
involved "more than a donor-donee relationship."'' 7 2 Nonetheless, it is
possible that a type of strict liability for defendant biotechnology firms or
research institutions could arise where potential plaintiff subjects and
donors are unaware of the financial implications of patented genes or of the
potential harms created by the practice. Plaintiffs may establish an
unauthorized use of their material whether it had been given for research
purposes or simply had been stored in a defendant's institution.
Additionally, whether or not such donor/plaintiffs are giving this material
with an expectation of payment or compensation might only be relevant in
cases asserting an action in quasi-contract and, in many cases, the
requirement may not be part of a prima facie case.
3. Claims based upon impediments to research and harms to the public
health
Where research has been impeded as a result of the patenting and
profiting from the human genetic material, patients denied the potential
benefits of medical research and breakthroughs in that disease could avail
themselves of the unjust enrichment claim. Patent holders withholding
information, data, and material stand as potential defendants, if privatization
and profit motives hinder the efforts of those searching for a particular cure.
Where a patent holder excludes others from evaluating and duplicating
research, claims as to the prevalence of certain genetic indicators cannot be
verified and unnecessary testing for a certain disease can occur, then
creating a class of plaintiffs undergoing such tests.
172.

Id.
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The "land grab" of broad patents resulting in the problems of multiple
rights-holders could similarly produce claims where the ability to create
new products and therapies has been delayed. The harms created by overly
broad patents granted to the original holders could also lead to potential
suits. For example, potential AIDS patients may claim that the owners of
the original patent on the receptor gene were unjustly enriched by excluding
the NIH in continuing to research the potential causes and cures of the
disease. The health concerns created by the exclusionary practices involved
in patents, such as the inability to detect a mutation for breast cancer, could
lead to suits against the patent holder, not only in tort, but also in the
substantive use of the unjust enrichment claim. Pharmaceutical company
patent holders who do not develop certain tests on drugs, where the test
could limit the potential customers for the drug itself, both imperil the
public health as well as escalate the price of drugs and testing and might
also be subject to claims of unjust enrichment.
These harms may pave the way for suits by large classes of plaintiffs
similar to the "dangerous product" cases and could proceed where the
genetic material in question exists as a benefit. This could occur even
wvhere potential plaintiffs may not actually have been donors of biological
and genetic materials or even where they might have consented to the use of
their genetic material as the basis for a patent. Despite consent potentially
having been given, the benefit could be categorized as the defendants'
externalities, where the avoidance of costs associated with patenting this
genetic material would be considered a resultant benefit. The potential
limitations to this notion of benefit are analogous to dangerous product
cases.
These biotechnological companies and research institutions
potentially have no duty to abate the costs associated with patenting human
genetic material and any medical harms created by the practice could be
considered too attenuated for liability to attach.
Nevertheless, the
precedential value of dangerous product cases establishes the concept of
benefit in the area of human gene patenting and future class action suits.
Similarly, the concept that the conferral of a benefit can be established
without an actual transfer having occurred, as reflected in the insider trading
cases, could aid large classes of plaintiffs claiming that an unjust
enrichment has occurred, even where their actual genetic material is not at
issue. That a benefit can exist independent of an actual transfer could also
assist plaintiffs where issues of identification arise when their genetic
material has been stored in bio-banks.
Based upon the effects and impact of patenting human genetic material,
it is arguable that profits resulting from gene patenting were to the
detriment, or at the expense, of potential societal plaintiff groups. As in any
unjust enrichment case however, whether the retention of the benefit "will
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol15/iss2/4
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give offense to equity and good conscience" will be critical in the analysis
of any potential claims.
The United States Constitution provides Congress the power "to promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."' " Thus, an economic incentive was introduced to promote
growth and innovation. Despite this, it is apparent that the Human Genome
Project's involvement in the corporate world induced companies to focus
on the ability to acquire immediate and immense profits as a result of
patenting human genetic material.' 4 This practice, which finds support in
the law of intellectual property, has impeded, rather than advanced, the
larger realm of scientific progress and discovery, the original goal of the
Constitutional mandate. By acknowledging the harms created by the
system of patenting, the belief that "the appropriation of knowledge as
intellectual property ... will
yield a greater public good in the long run" is
"a dubious assumption."'17 5
Certainly, defenses to this assertion will be offered, suggesting that the
patenting of human genetic material is not unjust and that the practice does
not produce the harms claimed but rather fosters innovation, progress, and
success in the fight against genetic disease. The varying factual scenarios
will settle these disputes and courts will define the limits and boundaries on
the perceived inequity. Nevertheless, the assertion that medical knowledge
is not serving a common good, a fundamental value which is "being
superceded by the normative changes taking place in biomedical
science,"' 176 provides an overriding rationale
to support a claim that "the
77
retention of the benefit is inequitable."'
This general rationale could be supported by two underlying
justifications for a finding of an inequitable retention of a benefit. Potential
biotechnological and pharmaceutical corporate defendants are making
excessive profits when corporations overreach and overcharge the public,
thus producing profits that can be considered a windfall for those parties.
Both instances occur to the detriment of society, suggesting the claim that
the retention of these profits/benefits is unjust. There is no doubt that the
existence of human genetic material supplied to research institutions,
biotechnological or pharmaceutical companies, is a benefit within the broad
and encompassing definition of the term. Whether the profits attained as a

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
See e.g., Krimsky, supra note 2, at 39.
Id.
Id. at 35.
See e.g., Greenberg,264 F. Supp. 2d at 1072.
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result of the acquisition of this benefit are excessive remains an open, factspecific question to be decided by courts in the future. The facts of
Greenberg are illustrative of the type of evidence courts may encounter in
claims that profits are excessive, stressing the quantitative nature of the
concept.
In 1988, four years after the Canavan gene was discovered, Miami
Children's Hospital sent out letters notifying clinics and researchers of the
need for a license prior to testing for the gene.'
The director of one lab
located at the University of Pennsylvania Health System received three
such letters. 7 9 The first indicated that although she could conduct a limited
number of tests at a cost of $12.50 each, the license could be revoked at any
time. " The second letter stated that the lab could obtain samples but not
perform testing and would have to send the samples to a licensed lab.' 8'
The third letter charged $12.50 for each test that had already been
performed, which had numbered under 100, and demanded an end to
testing.'1 2 As an important contrast, no royalties are collected from
researchers for using the gene for Tay-Sachs disease, although there is a
patent on it. 1 3
Instances of overcharging and overreaching might also be considered in
the context of human gene patents and drug companies where the
privatization of genetic material results in "the escalating price of
pharmaceuticals and therapeutic tests."' 84 Where the price of prescription
drugs is subject to political debate, the isolation of patents on human
genetic material as an underlying cause of these prices might be
determinative in a finding that biotechnological firms are overreaching and
overcharging as a result of their exclusionary patents.
It is also arguable that the practice of acquiring broad patents resembles
the innate concept of a windfall. The exclusivity created by a patent on a
small gene-fragment extends to every possible use and exploitation of its
potential. Unlike the discovery of new drugs, "the discovery of new genes
does not require the same economic incentives."' 85 The costs of performing
research and development that come with animal research and clinical
trials, as well as obtaining FDA approval, do not arise in the process of

178.
Research USA, Gene patent lawsuit may radically affect research, June 30, 2003,
http://ww", ResearchResearch.com.
17'.
Id.
180. Id.
Xl. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See Krimsky, supra note 2, at 37.
185. Andrews, supra note 2, at 77.
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gene discovery. "" Thus, the small costs in discovering the fragment
resulting in huge profits down the line can perhaps be viewed as inequitable
when considering the effects of the practice. It is indicative of the type of
claim that could be brought in future cases by plaintiff classes where,
despite the legality of the company's dealings, under tort, contract and
property law, the retention of the benefit provided to the defendant could be
considered unjust.
deCODE Genetics is a company which deals with population-based
genetic information and whose primary asset is a sample bank and database
of genealogical, genetic, and disease information on extended Icelandic
families."8 7 Research subjects are informed that they relinquish all claims
to financial gains resulting from any studies in which they are involved.'
In 2001, the company entered into an alliance with a corporation, HoffmanLa Roche, "to develop and market DNA-based diagnostics for major
diseases."' 8 9
This alliance "is potentially worth $300 million to
9
0
deCODE."'
There are other deals involving collaborations on drug
development where deCODE will be paid a milestone payment each time
the corporation maps a gene in a common disease and Hoffman-La Roche
discovers the drug.' 91 Thus, the providers of this genetic material could
certainly assert that they had conferred a benefit, the retention of which is
unjust, relying on rationales of excessive profits and windfalls.
Additionally, as in the ERISA cases, "societies' reasonable expectations
of person and property"'192 are implicated by the harms caused to the
common good by the practice of patenting human genetic material. Federal
legislation passed in the 1980s gave intellectual property rights in research
findings to institutions that had received federal grants. 93 Thus, publiclyfunded discoveries could be patented and licensed. "The basic research that
yields discoveries of genetic associations with disease have been

186. Id.
187. See generally deCODE Website, http://www.decode.com (last visited Apr. 7,
2006).
188. deCODE Patient Consent Form, available at http://www.decode.com/files/
filemanager/website 1/file 148517.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2006).
189.

deCODE and Roche Sign Landmark Alliance to Develop Integrated DNA-based

Diagnostic Tools and Related Services and Software, July 2, 2001, http://www.decode.com/
mainlview.jsp?branch=16701 l&e342RecordID=481 &e342DataStorelD=3917.
190. Id.
191. Press Release, Roche Pharmaceuticals, Roche and deCode Genetics Identify
Chromosomal Location of Genetic Risk For Osteporosis (Nov. 14, 2000), available at
http://www.rocheusa.com/newsroom/current/2000/pr20001ll402.html.
192. See, e.g., Heller v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 145 F.3d 487, 495 (D.C. 1998).
193. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (1994).
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underwritten by the public."' 194 Accordingly, "the public increasingly feels
it is paying twice for research - once to fund the research and then to the
biotech companies mining this taxpayer-funded research."' 95 Not unlike the
mistaken overpayment of pension funds in the ERISA cases, it is arguable
that the public money used to promote the public health should be
of these benefits is a
safeguarded and that the profits made by the retention
196
cost "unfairly borne by other members of the plan."'
It is the nature of the claim of unjust enrichment itself, however, which
could provide favorable outcomes to groups or classes of potential
plaintiffs. Broad and flexible notions of equity could find this deprivation
of the common good as "something identifiable, a priori, by the exercise of
a moral judgment anterior to legal rules."' 97 Moral judgments underlying
cases range from cohabitation situations to plaintiffs unable to retrieve
mistakenly lost possessions. Certainly in a cause of action where there are
"no strict rules" and "everything depends upon the circumstances of the
case, '
the retention of benefits accrued by the practice of patenting
human genetic material is unjust. The "circumstances will give offense to
equity and good conscience" if the practice continues. The harms created
will potentially be deterred by the use of the substantive claim of unjust
enrichment by groups and classes of plaintiffs affected by patents on human
genetic material.
B. Individual Claims
Where large societal groups or classes of plaintiffs assert claims of unjust
enrichment, these claims will most certainly be considered novel and
potentially difficult to prove. Causes of action arising out of dignitary
concerns might be considered too ephemeral, while the alleged harms to
society too attenuated. Where transfers have not occurred or where consent
has been given, new theories describing the nature of a benefit as the
avoidance of a defendant's externalities might not resonate in jurisdictions
where such theories have been discredited. Thus, individual claims of
unjust enrichment based upon the effects of patenting human genetic
material might prove to be an easier and more effective deterrent, where
specific instances of an unjust retention of a benefit can be found.

194.

Andrews, supra note 2, at 78 (quoting Jon Merz et al., Disease Gene Patenting is a

Bad Innovation, 2
195.
196.

197.
198.

MOLECULAR DIAGNOSIS

299, 301 (1997)).

Id. at 78.
Heller, 142 F.3d at 495.
See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 9, § 1.

Ames v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 942 F. Supp. 551, 558 (S.D. Fla.

1994).
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1.Individual claims arising from dignitary concerns
The unauthorized use of genetic material resulting in the
commodification of personal identity could be challenged by individuals as
well as groups w'ho have given their genetic material without the requisite
informed consent regarding economic interests. An example of such would
be a person whose individual DNA had been patented in contravention of
that person's religious beliefs. In 1992, the United Methodist Church's
genetics task force, which included a minister/geneticist and director of the
prenatal screening lab at Georgetown University, in addition to two
molecular biologists,199 addressed patent laws related to genetic engineering
by stating, "exclusive ownership rights of genes as a means of making
genetic technologies accessible raises serious theological concerns" and
"the issue is not science versus religion, it's the commodification of life the reduction of life to its commercial value and marketability. 20 °
Similarly, the executive director of the Southern Baptist Convention's
Christian Life Commission found that the process of patenting "represents
the usurpation of the ownership rights of the Sovereign of the Universe."
Likewise, Jew ish leaders haxe expressed the notion
that "the biotech
20 1
industry can survive without the patenting process.
Thus, as a motion filed in the Greenberg case has expressed, "an
individual who opposes a gene patent on religious grounds is not
sufficiently protected if his gene can be patented without his knowledge or
consent., 20 2 Although he has not been sufficiently protected as he would
have been had informed consent been required, he could have still find
recourse in a claim of unjust enrichment.
2. Individual claims based upon the unfair and unauthorized use of human
genetic material given by research subjects and/or providers of human
genetic materials
It is quite possible that an individual who has given his genetic material
as a research subject without knowing or understanding the effects of future
patents based upon this material might assert a claim that the defendant
patent holder has been unjustly enriched by the unauthorized use of his
genes. Although the 'ongoing collaboration' presented by the facts of
199.
SCIENCE,

See Richard Stone, Religious Leaders Oppose Patenting Genes and Animals,

May 26, 1995, at 1]26.

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See Plaintiffs' Motion and Memorandum of Law for Reconsideration of Order
Dismissing Count I of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research
Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (No. 02-22244-CIV-MORENO).
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Greenberg might prove distinctive, the analysis of benefit and an unjust
retention of such a benefit may be applicable based upon the broad and
flexible nature of the cause of action. When the inequity of the retention of
the benefit is based on the various circumstances of each case, there is no
necessity that any facts in such a claim must be identical to the Greenberg
scenario.
Similarly, an individual who has not specifically been the subject or
donor in the research context might also assert that his genetic material has
been used in an unauthorized manner. Upon ascertaining that his existing
or stored genetic material has been the basis of a patent and that profits
were realized from such a patent, an individual who had been unaware of
this occurrence might claim that the defendant patent holders were unjustly
enriched. Not unlike the revenue-producing cave in the Edwards case, the
use of such tissue or DNA taken in the course of standard medical
procedures results in profits accrued by the defendant patent owner, a
benefit received by the defendant, the retention of which is unjust.
3. Individual claims based upon specific medical harm
The possibility of substantive unjust enrichment claims based upon the
effects of human gene patents on an individual's health and/or medical
treatment is potentially great, where unlike claims of medical malpractice,
causation is not an element requiring proof in a prima facie case. Thus,
specific harm resulting from patenting and profiting from human genetic
material could be proven to be the basis of claims against institutional or
corporate patent holders without the difficulty of proving that the exclusive
patents on a gene caused the specific medical harm. Rather, the basis in
liability would exist in the inequitable retention of the benefits provided by
the exclusionary practices causing the harms.
These harms may arise either from lack of access to and the poor quality
of tests for genetic disease. Should a patient desire a test for the gene
associated with Alzheimer's disease, for example, the company holding the
patent on the specific gene might allow the test only to be done it its
°3
laboratory, which might be prohibitive for that hypothetical patient.:
Thus, a delayed diagnosis resulting in medical harms will subject a
defendant patent holder to potential liability.
The practice of charging restrictive licensing and royalty fees for the use

203.
See Andrews, supra note 2, at 89 (discussing Julian Borger, Rush to Patent Genes
Stalls Cures for Disease, GUARDIAN, Dec. 5, 1999, at 1): see also Andrea Knox, The Great
Gene Grab: Firms Toss Researchers For a Loop, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Feb. 13, 2000, at
Al (discussing how Athena Diagnostics of Worchester, Massachusetts, charges twice as
much as a hospital would for Alzheimer's gene testing).
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of tests developed from patented genes also can lead to cases where access
to testing is denied. For example, the Canadian province of British
Columbia discontinued testing for breast cancer because their system could
not afford the costs of the tests as charged by the Myriad Company.2(
Similarly, an individual plaintiff involved in a case such as Greenberg
could claim that he was either denied access to a genetic test or could not
afford one due to the effects of exclusive gene patenting. This could occur
even where he had provided the genetic material used as the basis for
identi/ying the gene sequence causing the disease.
Additionally. harm might result when a patent holder excludes others
from testing for their exclusi\ ely owned genes, eliminating the possibility
that various unknovn mutations in the same gene will be found. This
A
situation was suggested by the actual Myriad breast cancer case.
patient with a genetic mutation causing breast cancer which was missed as a
result of exclusionary testing could potentially assert that the patent holder
company had been unjustly enriched as a result of such practices.
Claiming that an illness and its ensuing treatment costs resulted from an
undiagnosed or misdiagnosed genetic test might be difficult to prove in a
medical malpractice case, where standards of care and causation create
limits on liability. Hoxxever. an individual patient suffering from the
inability to have treated a potentially treatable disease due to inaccessible,
unaffordable, or inadequate testing might assert that a defendant patent
holder has been unjustly enriched. The acquisition of genetic material is
arguably a benefit, acknowledged in the attempt to procure the patent itself.
An individual patient's suffering could by itself establish that the retention
of the benefit is inequitable and unjust when caused by the practice of
patenting human genetic material. The underlying rationale is a simple,
basic moral principle.
Additional rationales such as windfalls, excessive profits, and public
policy concerns might exist for an individual as well as a societal group or
class as the basis for a claim in unjust enrichment. The defendant patent
holders' profits could be illuminated in the context of myriad cases
illustrating the effects of patenting human genetic material on human
health. These include scenarios such as an older patient struggling with and
unprepared for the ravages of Alzheimer's disease, a family torn apart by a
young mother's death caused by ignorance of genetic markers predicting
breast cancer, or a young child dying from Canavan's disease. These
204. Andrews, supra note 2, at 91 n.166 (hospitals in British Columbia had a hereditary
cancer program budget of $500,000, while the cost of Myriad testing alone was close to $1.5
million).
205. Id. at 89-90 (discussing Steven Benowitz, French challenge to BRCAI Patent
UnderliesEuropean Discontent, 94 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 80, 80 (2002)).
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claims based upon the lack of a specific genetic test will again potentially
be considered novel. However, in the face of these and numerous other
potentially troubling occurrences, the historic and traditional nature of the
cause of action could be determinative where "fundamental principles of
justice, equity, and good conscience"-2 6 have been violated.
VII. CONCLUSION
A fundamental irony exists in the Greenberg decision in the court's
concern that upholding the informed consent claim would somehow impede
medical research. The court agreed with the defendants' contentions that
"this requirement would have pernicious effects over medical research, as it
would give complete control over how medical research is used and who
Ultimately, the opinion looks at the
benefits from that research." 20
practical implications, stating, "it would be unworkable and would chill
medical research as it would mandate that researchers constantly evaluate
whether a discloseable event has occurred. Second, this extra duty would
give rise to a type of dead hand control that research subjects could hold
because they would be able to dictate how medical research progresses.', 20 8
These expressions can potentially be seen as the court misunderstanding,
denying, or ignoring the extensive and numerous problems resulting from
the practice of patenting human genetic material. Perhaps it can even be
viewed more cynically as a veiled protection of the economic interests of
the biotechnological industry. It is interesting to note that the court
dismissed the fact that the American Medical Association ("AMA") did not
seem to share the court's concern over chilling effects.20 9 Its guidelines
state that "potential commercial applications must be disclosed to the
patient before a profit is realized on products developed from biological
material" and "human tissue and its products may not be used for
commercial purposes without the informed consent of the patient who
provided the original cellular material." 210 Nonetheless, the court found
that these ethical rules were not conclusively binding on the parties because
they had been adopted after the plaintiffs had given their tissue to the
defendants. 21'
206. Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1072
(S.D. Fla. 2003).
207. Id.at 1070.
208. Id. at 1070-71.
209. Id. at 1070 (citing AMA Code of Medical Ethics, E-208 Commercial Use of
Human Tissue, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/8427.html (last
visited Apr. 7, 2006)).

210.

Id.

211.

Id. at 1070.
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However, it is possible that the dismissal of this other claim, coupled
with the refusal to dismiss the claim of unjust enrichment, will have far
greater implications for the developing law regarding the practice and
effects of patenting human genetic material. Closing the door on informed
consent of economic interests. yet acknowledging an inequity existed under
the circumstances, predicts that litigation questioning the practice of
patenting human genetic material will continue to proceed. In dismissing
the conversion claim based upon the precedent in Moore that "one has no
property interest in their body tissue and genetic information,"'21 2 perhaps
the court was attempting to prevent radical outcomes resulting from any
fundamental change in property law. However, the duty to disclose
economic interests illustrated by the AMA's guidelines seemingly offers a
much narrower restriction on current practices.
Informed consent
requirements regarding human research offer choice, including economic
choice, yet medical research involving human subjects continues. The use
of the claim of unjust enrichment, however, questioning the practice of
patenting and profiting from human genetic material has a much wider
scope with broad and far-reaching implications.
The use of the cause of action will enable one to claim that a defendant
has been unjustly enriched, requiring restitution to the plaintiff. A result
exemplified by numerous situations, including the defendant's
nondisclosure of economic interests; the loss of a plaintiffs dignitary
interests such as religious belief or human identity; and where medical
research and scientific progress has been impeded, causing either individual
or societal harm. Historically broad and flexible notions of equity will
identify these circumstances as giving rise to considerations of fairness and
conscience, potentially implying and impelling a fundamental reordering of
the system.
Numerous critics are already demanding a reconsideration of the practice
of patenting and profiting from the use of human genetic material and
various alternatives and policy options are being considered to address the
inherent problems created by both research and biotechnological
institutions. 1 3 The substantive claim of unjust enrichment and the
underlying notion of restitution, filling the gap in property, intellectual
property, and tort law, per Greenberg, is one such alternative to be
considered in the ongoing debate.

212. Greenburg, 264 F. Supp. 2d. at 1074 (citing Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
793 P.2d 479, 487 (Cal. 1990), which noted that there have been no reported court decisions
imposing conversion liability for the use of human cells in medical research).
213. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 2, at 95-106 (describing various alternatives to
human gene patenting).
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